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ARTICLE
DEVELOPMENT ON A CRACKED
FOUNDATION: HOW THE INCOMPLETE
NATURE OF NEW DEAL LABOR REFORM
PRESAGED ITS ULTIMATE DECLINE
A Response to Cuéllar, Levi, and Weingast
LEO E. STRINE, JR.*
Reading Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Margaret Levi, and Barry R. We-
ingast’s1 essay, Twentieth-Century America as a Developing Country: Con-
flict, Institutions, and the Evolution of Public Law,2 gives a twenty-first-
century admirer of the New Deal and European social democracy a tempo-
rary nostalgic lift, which is then followed by melancholy. The reason is that
the benefit of looking back from the last part of the second decade of this
century is to recognize just how much of the gains rightly celebrated by the
Authors have been eroded. In doing an excellent job making a case for the
essentiality of law in guaranteeing stability, compromise, and the peaceful
resolution of disputes between employers and their workforce, the Authors
implicitly also underscore another reality: that something is essential does
not mean that it is, in itself, sufficient.
In responding to this provocative and incisive essay, I will focus on a
select number of factors conducive to the important legal developments that
America as a Developing Country champions, as well as some of the factors
that can, in retrospect, be seen presaging the ultimate undermining of those
developments. Recognizing that the Authors’ analysis primarily involves a
positive historical analysis, I will also offer some normative thoughts on
what I believe are the necessary steps to preserve—and to some extent, re-
store—the stability and gainsharing enabled by the new forms of public law
the Authors have adeptly analyzed.
In particular, I will note how the New Deal’s acceptance of the most
unsavory aspects of our nation’s history—specifically its acquiescence to
Jim Crow and a political power structure that did not fully share the princi-
* Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Penn-
sylvania Law School; Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Senior
Fellow, Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance; and Henry Crown Fellow,
Aspen Institute. The author is grateful to Christine Balaguer, Margaret Pfeiffer, Kirby Smith,
and Reilly Steel for their help.
1 For ease of reference, I shall refer to Cuéllar, Levi, and Weingast as “the Authors.”
2 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Margaret Levi & Barry R. Weingast, Twentieth-Century
America as a Developing Country: Conflict, Institutions, and the Evolution of Public Law, 57
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 25 (2020) [hereinafter America as a Developing Country].
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ples of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)3—impeded the ultimate
realization of gainsharing for American workers. That is, consistent with the
Authors’ recognition that the United States that was reformed by the New
Deal was a developing, not fully developed, nation, this Article focuses on
the extent to which the New Deal’s failure to eradicate ideological divisions,
inequities, and power structures rooted in our nation’s history affected the
ultimate success of the New Deal in the key areas of working people’s rights
and economic security.
My emphasis will be more on the gloomy side of things, rather than on
the optimistic. But my reason for that is itself positive in spirit, not negative.
Unless we candidly consider and thoughtfully address the foundational
weaknesses that ultimately undercut the effectiveness of the New Deal-so-
cial democratic approach to protecting American workers’ fair expectations,
we are unlikely to restore the leverage and equitable treatment working peo-
ple in this nation deserve.
In particular, I will identify fundamental difficulties the NLRA faced
once the United States’ unchallenged position as a hegemonic economic
powerhouse ended. These difficulties had their origins in the incompletely
realized nature of the New Deal, and involved:
• The failure of the New Deal to obtain the full support of the
American South for the rights of working people, as opposed to
the South’s willingness to accept subsidies in the form of infra-
structure investments, middle-class entitlements, and other lar-
gesse from the wealthier regions of the nation;
• The failure of the New Deal to address racial inequality, both
during the New Deal and in fighting World War II itself, result-
ing in a rift within the working class between a newly unified
and prosperous white working class and black Americans;
• The failure of the New Deal to embed the protections for work-
ing people exemplified by the NLRA, the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938,4 and others, in the post-War international trading
regime. The post-War regime instead gave clout only to mobil-
ized capital and not to working people, and exposed American
workers to competition from workers who lacked equivalent
collective-bargaining rights and protections from unsafe work-
ing conditions; and,
• The dependency of the NLRA itself on faithful implementation
by the Executive Branch, and by a judiciary that would hold the
executive accountable for fidelity to the statute’s purpose, a de-
pendency that left the statute vulnerable to undermining by pres-
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2018).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2018).
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idential administrations who viewed unions as things to be
made fewer in number and weaker in influence.
To move forward in a productive and more equitable direction now, a
renewed effort must be made to address these issues. To this day, the South
lags behind most of the nation in economic prosperity,5 and its working- and
middle-class workers could benefit from increased voice in making progress.
And politicians are still able to exploit racial tensions and divide the work-
ing-class vote in a way that compromises the ability to restore potency to the
union movement. Similarly, the international trading regime’s failure to suf-
ficiently protect labor rights has led to calls to restrict trade to protect work-
ing people and to the increasing identification of the “other,” in the form of
foreign workers and immigrant labor, as the source of declining real wages
for American workers. Compounding these problems has been a federal ju-
diciary increasingly hostile to the rights supposedly enshrined in the NLRA,6
and a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) that has done little to
make those rights have meaning in the real economy.7
Absent a forthright agenda that emphasizes the shared interests of
working people of all colors, as well as connects the decline in gainsharing
between workers and the corporations for whom they toil with the decline in
unions and overall employee voice, an enlightened approach to addressing
growing inequality in our nation is unlikely to emerge. That agenda must
address the reality that the world’s economy has become irreversibly global-
ized. There is no constructive and humane way forward that does not require
the hard work of extending enforceable labor rights internationally and put-
ting increasing upward pressure on employers to increase worker pay and
wellbeing throughout the world’s trading markets. The New Deal idea that
all workers deserve economic security, safe working conditions, and a fair
say is not outdated; it is widely shared throughout the OECD nations, and
most in the developing world seek to implement it in their own nations.
What is outdated is the thought that this idea can work without making it the
rule of law across the scope of the economy in which we expect American
workers to compete. Just as the New Deal reflected the reality that an effec-
tive national system was required to make a nationwide economy work bet-
ter for the many, so too must any agenda to help working people reflect the
reality of a global economy and the need for law’s effectiveness to expand
accordingly.
5 See Sharon Nunn, The South’s Economy Is Falling Behind: ‘All of a Sudden the Money
Stops Flowing,’ WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-souths-econ-
omy-is-falling-behind-all-of-a-sudden-the-money-stops-flowing-11560101610 [https://
perma.cc/NNW5-4ATE] (documenting that the South’s per capita income has been below
other regions since the 1890s).
6 See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1138 (2018) (exempting
automotive service advisors from NLRA).
7 See, e.g., Emanuel Johnson Controls, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. 20 (2019) (approving more
lenient standard for decertifying unions).
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This response proceeds in two parts. Part I engages with the Authors’
positive analysis of the factors that led to the survival of our nation’s consti-
tutional democracy, emphasizing certain other dynamics that I believe con-
tributed to the stability and compromise necessary to make our democracy
work in the face of the Great Depression. Part II takes a pessimistic turn,
describing the negative aspects of the United States law and development
story that ultimately undermined the ability of the NLRA to realize its prom-
ise of providing working Americans with the leverage necessary to obtain
fair gainsharing from their employers.
I.
I largely agree with the story told in America as a Developing Country
about the NLRA’s development. But I thought it might be modestly useful to
tease out a few dynamics that I think contributed to the optimistic story the
Authors tell.
First of all, our nation’s history provided a strong bulwark against the
authoritarian answer. This is not to say that an authoritarian answer to the
Great Depression was not possible. But there were reasons to think that the
United States was less susceptible to that answer, or to answers involving
revolution and violence. Even by the 1930s, it is doubtful that most Ameri-
cans were ignorant of the awful costs of our Civil War, and in any way
anxious to risk courses of action that would again risk violence on that sort
of scale.
As important, we had a creedal notion of the nation: unlike most other
nations, the United States in particular had to be built out of some notion of
shared ideals. At its most fundamental, the entire U.S. existence exemplified
rejection of deference to authoritarian rule because that regime is not ac-
countable to the people. This was the very reason to be of the United States.
And although much about our creed is contestable, it is less contestable that
the contenders for political power typically had to justify their arguments in
some conception of the nation that was not based on a religious faith, a
particular ethnic origin, or a family dynasty, but rather in some set of princi-
ples consistent with a conception of a republic. Even when seeking to leave
the nation to protect slavery, the Confederates sought to explain why their
course of action was the one most consistent with the nation’s founding
principles.8
The creed was itself focused on the use of law to make sure that each
got his due. This was true both in the sense that the governed had a role in
selecting the governors, but also in the sense that all men had inalienable
rights that were not granted by government and could not be taken away by
8 See, e.g., DECLARATION OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE
SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION (1860), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp [https://perma.cc/J6AW-4V6A].
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government without due process of law.9 Of course, the failure to apply
these principles fairly to all—in particular to black people—for most of our
nation’s history is the primary stain on our nation. Yet, the very power of the
underlying principles put strong moral force behind the ultimate decline, and
one hopes, ultimately full erasure of the concept of the “other.” For present
purposes, these principles also made it harder for absolutist ideologies like
communism and fascism that subordinate the individual to a single collec-
tive end to take hold in the United States.
The immigrant experience in the United States also played a role in this
creedal orientation. Many immigrants came from places with governments
based on older traditions—less based on certain legal ideals and more on
authority and national identity in the sense of ethnicity and religious denomi-
nation. One shared value among immigrants might have been a desire not to
find themselves back in the same situation they had departed. Relatedly,
America’s revolutionary ideals of personal and economic liberty had to play
an important role in the decision of many immigrants to choose the United
States as their destination. And the reality that American immigrants came
from diverse nations limited the possibility that any ruling elite could
emerge out of a particular ethnic group using ethnicity or some proxy for it
as a basis for rule.10
Building on this tradition of framing issues in a quintessentially Ameri-
can manner, American legal and political thinkers earlier in the 20th century
had done important thinking about the evolutions in law and institutions nec-
essary to govern a growing and rapidly changing society. Without denying
the important variations in emphasis between the progressives of the early
part of the 20th century and the “liberals” who populated the New Deal, the
larger continuity in their vision is evident and important.11 The progressive
movement took seriously the idea that with economic power came responsi-
bility. Citizens were entitled to a government that acted on the basis of prin-
ciples, not payola. It was important to spread the blessings of education. And
society could not function without critical new areas of legal and institu-
tional development—administrative law—that involved the creation of insti-
tutions that were neither traditionally executive, nor traditionally
9 See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); Abraham Lincoln, The
Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
10 In the South, the concept of race may have allowed certain ruling elites to keep control
over poorer whites by forging a white versus black dynamic. See generally NANCY ISENBERG,
WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR UNTOLD HISTORY OF CLASS IN AMERICA (2016).
11 See Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism
from the Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at
31–32), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3086&con-
text=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/GQ5T-LWKV] (documenting the growth of the
administrative state during the progressive era and World War I); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal
Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1365 (2010)
(documenting the substantial growth in the administrative state and developing administrative
law norms, such as providing substantial procedural protections to participants in administra-
tive processes during the late ninetieth and early twentieth centuries).
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adjudicative, but that involved elements of each.12 And during the relatively
short American involvement in World War I, many of these principles had
been put into practical use in mobilizing the American economy for the war
effort.13
To my mind, no account of the NLRA or New Deal can underestimate
the unique good fortune that Franklin Roosevelt emerged as the nation’s
leader in 1933. Had the uninspiring tenor of the Hoover era continued, in-
stead of being replaced by FDR’s sunny and confident leadership, darker
answers may well have gained purchase. As is well known, Roosevelt was
not a rigid thinker, and certainly not an ideologue. But he did understand the
distinctly liberal direction in which he intended to take the nation, and that
he stood unmistakably on the side of the many as opposed to the few. FDR
served in the Wilson Administration, whose domestic agenda was progres-
sive in nature as to economic issues; he had been in a top position during the
war effort and involved in the coordination that occurred between govern-
ment and the private sector to make the war effort successful; and his admin-
istration as New York governor was decidedly progressive in orientation.14
Thus, when he populated his presidential administration, FDR looked to
many of the most distinguished legal thinkers of his time to serve and to help
build the institutions that the nation ultimately used to address the Great
Depression, regulate a nationwide economy, and win World War II.15
A legal titan of course took a famous shot at FDR’s intellect;16 what that
titan perhaps misunderstood was that who a leader surrounds himself with
and entrusts with important tasks is itself a reflection of how first-rate his
intellect is. For such a lengthy administration, the Roosevelt administration
was notable for its lack of scandal and the quality of its key policymakers,
12 Related is the professionalization of the bureaucracy during this period, enabled by civil
service reforms like the Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (amended 1978). As the
Authors observe, “[m]any political progressives attacked patronage politics and advocated for
a shift to a merit-based civil service.” America as a Developing Country, supra note 2, at 40
n.71. Additionally, civil service job protections likely helped to foster expertise in agencies
and legitimize the administrative state in the eyes of the public. For an argument that civil
service protections, combined with legislative grants of policy discretion, help to create expert
bureaucracies, see Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 87873 (2007). See generally
DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NET-
WORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001) (exploring the
development of the bureaucracy during the Progressive Era); SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W.
PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING: EXPERTISE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH (2013) (developing further the links between institutional arrangements such as civil
service systems, accountability, and expertise).
13 See Lee, supra note 11, at 32 (“World War I drove Congress to greatly expand the
breadth of its delegations to agencies, brought administration to many sectors of the economy,
and grew new capacities within the Department of Defense to handle everything from excus-
ing conscientious objectors to managing munitions.”).
14 See, e.g., ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A POLITICAL LIFE 40–74, 101–33
(2017).
15 See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
16 See KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933–1937, at 54–55 (1986).
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especially perhaps those who helped work on shaping institutions that medi-
ated the key constituencies of a complex, modern economy. These policy-
makers, like Adolf Berle, William Douglas, Samuel Rosenman, Raymond
Moley, Basil O’Connor, and others, built on the prior work of icons like
Louis Brandeis and on initiatives like the uniform laws movement.17
The convergence of a leader who was directionally committed, but ex-
perimental and flexible, with an evolved sense of what administrative law
could be was felicitous. Perhaps most of all, what was felicitous was the
convergence of a genuine national emergency with a leader who would pur-
sue innovative solutions to address that emergency, but only solutions that
were consistent with the basic concepts of liberty central to the American
self-conception. Put simply, FDR was willing to do new stuff, but was in no
way prepared to deny American business leaders the right to own their busi-
nesses, make a profit, or enjoy the economic freedoms traditionally cele-
brated as part of the American way. FDR did ask more of them—for them to
recognize that there was a basic social compact that business must honor and
to adapt their means of interacting with the government and constituencies
like labor. But he never turned away from the basic idea of a market-based
economy and the right to own property.18
Thus, instinctively, Roosevelt was drawn to evolutionary change, and
as a natural political animal, to methods of governance that bridged conflict-
ing interests by focusing the contending parties on common objectives, upon
which both were ultimately dependent. In other words, FDR understood that
you could not fight over who got more of the pie, unless there was in fact a
pie to argue over; and that if you could create the potential for shared gains,
you were more likely to be successful. Institutions of administrative law like
17 See infra note 27.
18 As someone who knows more about the evolution of Argentina’s national soccer team
than its politics, I have focused my reply almost exclusively on the story that the Authors tell
about the U.S. Two comparative points do deserve underscoring, however. First, it is interest-
ing to consider how FDR’s deviation from one American tradition—the Cincinnatus-inspired
tradition of serving only two terms at most—was important to resisting authoritarianism and
forging a strong regulatory state of the kind that emerged after World War II. Although there is
no hint that FDR would have ever sought to stay in power without being elected by the people
every four years, the stability his lengthy tenure provided contrasts in an interesting way with
the Argentine example of frequent military interventions and coups. Second and relatedly, it is
striking how central the Argentine military was in its nation’s politics, and yet how compara-
tively unstoried its military was as a fighting power. As one of the Authors shows in other
work, the U.S. had no tradition of a large standing military, and its military was smaller than
that of the Netherlands on the eve of World War II. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Adminis-
trative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1351–52 (2014); see also America as a Developing
Country, supra note 2, at 52. Our military’s ultimate overwhelming power in World War II
derived from the democratic mobilization of a people more interested in seeking a good life
through economically productive activity. That Americans saw themselves as folks who would
put down the shovel, the plow, the hammer, or the accounting ledger when required to fight a
war limited any cult of adoration of military leaders and also suggests how difficult it would
have been for an authoritarian approach that substantially limited economic freedom to suc-
ceed in the U.S.
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the NLRA that fostered constructive conditions for livable compromise were
a natural component to policies based on these premises.
It is doubtful, however, that mediating structures like the NLRA could
have succeeded without supporting policies creating more pie to share. No
doubt the New Deal was never fully successful in overcoming the full blow
of the Great Depression. Still, it did much to alleviate the worst of its effects,
put many people back to work, provide greater economic security, and show
that the institutions of society could respond in an effective and humane
way.19 The New Deal had, at its core, a commitment to providing jobs and
good wages to American workers, evidenced by the fact that during the
1930s, the U.S. contributed a larger share of its own gross national product
to social security relief programs than other developed countries.20
This positive momentum led FDR to a historic reelection in 1936. And
when the recovery stalled in FDR’s second term, there were also other forces
beyond the NLRA that encouraged Americans to follow the more coopera-
tive path of industrial-labor progress he had charted. By FDR’s second term,
war was looming in both Asia and Europe. Having recently experienced
World War I, Americans had no taste for war and most likely saw the emerg-
ing developments as warning signals against fascism or communism, rather
than highlighting them as good models to follow. Sure, some benighted
elites, like Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh, idolized the Germans,21 and
Father Coughlin did his best to blame working class economic insecurities
on Jews,22 but the United States had only recently lost over 100,000 lives
fighting Germany, and the small constituencies for authoritarian, totalizing
solutions—fascists and communists—were split. Not only that, but the
United States had a diverse multi-ethnic white voting class to whom Aryan
racial appeals of the kind Hitler made were—at that time—unlikely to find
traction. As to communism, its appeal in an America, where a large segment
of ordinary people still owned farms and small businesses,23 was never sub-
stantial. This is not to say that workers did not want more clout; it is just to
say that, by the late 1930s, a responsive system allowing that desire for
greater voice to be expressed through unions within a market economy fit
much better with the distinct American ethos.
19 See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 363–81 (2001).
20 See generally EDWIN AMENTA, BOLD RELIEF: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE ORI-
GINS OF MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY (2000).
21 See, e.g., MAX WALLACE, THE AMERICAN AXIS: HENRY FORD, CHARLES LINDBERGH,
AND THE RISE OF THE THIRD REICH 200 (2003).
22 See, e.g., Mary Christine Athans, Courtesy, Confrontation, Cooperation: Jewish-Chris-
tian/Catholic Relations in the United States, 28 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN 107, 115–16 (2010).
23 See America as a Developing Country, supra note 2, at 41 (“More fundamentally, the
distribution of land and wealth in the United States was also markedly different––and dis-
persed enough to facilitate the rise of a relatively large merchant and artisan middle class wary
of corruption.”).
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In other words, there were reasons aside from the NLRA itself why
greater labor peace might have ensued during the late 1930s, even if the
economy was not fully recovered in health. This is not to slight the NLRA’s
framework—it fit the time well—but it is to suggest that without the other
aspects of the New Deal that created hope for more substantive economic
security, the NLRA alone was likely to be inadequate.
Then, the big thing happened. World War II. America as a Developing
Country recognizes this as seismic, but it sees history a bit differently than I
do on a key point. The Authors view FDR’s response to the war as signaling
an end to the New Deal. I do not. The war could have led to an even more
far-reaching expansion of the regulatory state than occurred, and this failure
disappointed some. But, I think that emphasis on the negative ignores that
the war effort cemented the New Deal’s foundational role in governing
American society. As America as a Developing Country shows, the war ef-
fort depended critically on the emergence of strong institutions and adminis-
trative law (as Cuéllar highlights in prior work),24 and an expectation that the
most powerful private economic interests engage in gainsharing and make
their own sacrifices to make sure we won the war.
Although many economists argue that the New Deal did not itself over-
come the Great Depression, the New Deal’s efforts at capacity building laid
important groundwork that allowed the United States to enter—and win—
World War II. As the Authors recognize, before the U.S. entered World War
II its “army was small, the 18th largest in the world in the spring of 1940,
just behind the Dutch army that had recently surrendered to the Nazis.”25
But, in part because of the New Deal’s efforts at capacity building in terms
of mediating institutions of law, even efforts like the National Recovery Ad-
ministration (“NRA”) that did not ultimately pan out, the U.S. was able to
build on the institutional development and experiments of the New Deal to
move to quickly mobilize a nation to win the war. In other words, to discon-
nect the New Deal from the war effort seems wrong to me—the New Deal’s
approaches; the centralizing, national institutions it built; and even aborted
experiments like the NRA, served as models for the organizational effort
essential to America’s success in rapidly mobilizing to defeat the Axis
powers.
One of the main achievements of the New Deal—if the New Deal is
considered to include the continuing development of the administrative state
during the World War II era, as I believe it must be—was to extend the
scope of effective government regulatory authority to make that authority
coextensive with the effective scope of the U.S. domestic economy. By in-
creasingly replacing, supplementing, and goading state governments with a
view to greater effectiveness, the federal administrative state began to create
a more level national playing field within which business competition would
24 See generally Cuéllar, Administrative War, supra note 18.
25 America as a Developing Country, supra note 2, at 52.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\HLL106.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-FEB-20 9:31
76 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
take place. The NLRA was just one of the regulatory schemes that helped
eventually accomplish this vital goal, and federal legislation was also ac-
companied by important state-level laws that were expressly designed to fa-
cilitate a national economy and a mobile population whose lives would
commonly involve activities in more than one state, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code and its sister uniform laws.26
The New Deal’s basic idea, in many ways, was to match the scope of
the regulatory state (including worker protection) to the scope of the real
economy. FDR and his key advisors realized that this job would not stop at
the boundaries of the United States but would have to continue if the gains
of the New Deal were to be secured in an international trading regime.27
That is another important reason why I do not distinguish the New Deal
from the Roosevelt administration’s war effort: the administration presented
the ideals of the New Deal to the world as representing the path forward to a
more prosperous, peaceful, and fair international order. In advance of World
War II, representatives of the Roosevelt administration argued that the ex-
pansion of trade, and the recognition of the fair expectations of working
people were the best method by which nations could remain free and resist
totalizing forces.28 During World War II itself, FDR elevated freedom from
want as an essential aspect of a genuinely free society.29 Consistent with that,
it was part of FDR’s vision that the post-War world would involve more
open markets, but among nations who committed to both expanding trade
and giving working people greater assurances of fair treatment and eco-
nomic security, including the rights in the NLRA.30 Roosevelt viewed it as
vital that the democratically elected Allied governments demonstrate that a
market-based economy could work better for the many than the alternatives,
26 See generally Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325 (1995).
27 See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Construction of a General International Organi-
zation, 10 DEP’T ST. BULL. 97, 99 (1944) (arguing that the creation of a post-War international
organization to govern security and economic issues was vital to creating the conditions for a
lasting peace and stable world order).
28 See, e.g., Arthur W. Schatz, The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull’s
Search for Peace 1936–1938, 57 J. AM. HIST. 85, 85–86 (1970).
29 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress: State of the Union Address
(Jan. 6, 1941), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16092 [https://perma.cc/
8C2V-ANZE] (“In the future days which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world
founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—
everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own
way—everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world
terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime
life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear—which,
translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in
such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.” (emphasis added)).
30 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
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including those touted by the Allies’ communist rival, the U.S.S.R.31 Put
31 From the beginning of his presidency, FDR linked the rise of fascism and communism
and international instability to economic insecurity. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This Mo-
ment: The Enduring Relevance of Adolf Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 267, 274–82 (2019) (discussing, through a focus on FDR’s close advisor, Adolf Berle, the
linkage that FDR and his administration drew between economic security and the ability to
maintain a peaceful world order). Thus, when World War II arose, FDR emphasized the need
for the post-War order to promote economic prosperity that extended to the many, an emphasis
seen in critical communications like the Atlantic Charter and his 1941 and 1944 State of the
Union addresses. The Atlantic Charter, Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the
United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, (Aug. 14, 1941) (“[The United
States and the United Kingdom] desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all
nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards,
economic advancement and social security.”); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Con-
gress on the State of the Union (Jan. 6, 1941), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/in-
dex.php?pid=16092 [https://perma.cc/X657-CCW7] (“Certainly this is no time for any of us
to stop thinking about the social and economic problems which are the root cause of the social
revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world.”). In his 1944 State of the Union
address, FDR essentially called for a global New Deal. FDR’s views factored importantly into
key international agreements such as the understandings created at Bretton Woods, including
its call for an International Trade Organization that would protect labor rights and the United
Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. Compare Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/in-
dex.php?pid=16518 [https://perma.cc/A3PY-HWRD] (“The best interests of each Nation,
large and small, demand that all freedom-loving nations shall join together in a just and dura-
ble system of peace. . . . And an equally basic essential to peace—permanent peace—is a
decent standard of living for all individual men and women and children in all Nations.”), with
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 22 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Eve-
ryone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization,
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization
and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his
dignity and the free development of his personality.”), and id. art. 23 (“1. Everyone has the
right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to
protection against unemployment. 2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work. 3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuner-
ation ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supple-
mented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 4. Everyone has the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”), and id. art. 24 (“Everyone has the
right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holi-
days with pay.”), and id. art. 25 (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemploy-
ment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.”); see also Robert Kuttner, How the Globalists Ceded the Field to Donald
Trump, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 19, 2018), http://prospect.org/article/how-globalists-ceded-field-
donald-trump [https://perma.cc/9SQD-ETT9] (“The original International Trade Organization
proposed at Bretton Woods called for a regime that would promote commerce but also defend
enforceable labor standards. A treaty creating the ITO was negotiated in 1947, but never rati-
fied.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Economic Security: A Human Right; Reclaiming Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 20, 2004), http://prospect.org/article/
economic-security-human-right [https://perma.cc/9VRM-ZYPP] (“Roosevelt’s speech has had
a large international influence; the Second Bill of Rights should be seen as a leading American
export. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written in the shadow of FDR and ac-
cepted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, explicitly includes social and economic guaran-
tees.”). All of the United States’ post-War initiatives built on the New Deal and its goal of
making a market-based economic system work for the many, an approach quite distinct from
that advocated by the United States’ wartime ally, the Soviet Union.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\HLL106.txt unknown Seq: 12 12-FEB-20 9:31
78 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
simply, making capitalism benefit the working class was seen as crucial to
cabining not just fascism, but also the post-War growth of communism.
The war effort also created propitious circumstances for win-win eco-
nomic outcomes. Demand grew enormously, as did production.32 Thus, in
the middle of an awful conflict emerged an unprecedented engine for pros-
perity. This engine hummed well into the post-War era, creating the ideal
circumstances for the mediating approach taken by the NLRA to be success-
ful, as employers had gains to share, and there was much more pie to be
allocated.
The other aspects of the New Deal helped in that regard, as govern-
ment’s greater role in areas like health care, Social Security, disability insur-
ance, housing subsidies, education grants, unemployment insurance, and
workers’ compensation meant that the economic security of working people
and their families was supported not solely by employers, but by society as a
whole.33
Finally, World War II and its success also help to explain in another
way the story the Authors tell about the secure establishment of the Ameri-
can administrative state. As the Authors show, during the midst of fighting a
war, the U.S. economy became the wealthiest in world history, and the na-
tion emerged from a fierce war triumphant and productive. That the Ameri-
can people viewed their national government as having succeeded in
overcoming not just one but two major national crises—the Great Depres-
sion and Axis aggression—imbued government leaders and institutions with
confidence and respect.34 Part of the lessons many Americans drew from
those experiences was that a return to a shrunken national government and
small military would leave the U.S. vulnerable to the same tragedies it had
just overcome at great cost. Put simply, because the national government and
the administrative state that FDR built were widely viewed as indispensable
to America weathering the Great Depression and defeating foreign aggres-
sion, there was no appetite to dismantle them. Nor did a sound empirical
case for doing so exist given the evolutions in the complexity and scale of
the domestic and international issues that the U.S. was required to address.
II.
The World War II experience of Americans, however, also had a pro-
foundly inequitable effect, which must be considered if anyone is to come to
32 See generally HAROLD G. VATTER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR II (1985).
33 See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Law & Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62
MD. L. REV. 515, 546–49, 558–61 (2003) (describing the successes of the New Deal’s Social
Security guarantee, education grants, and housing subsidies).
34 In the decades following World War II into the 1960s, public trust in government was
above seventy percent. See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2019, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-
2019 [https://perma.cc/U8PY-FHLU]. Today, by contrast, public trust is down to about seven-
teen percent. Id.
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grips with the rift among the working class that has hindered the ability to
forge an economic system giving more voice to workers, and thus the declin-
ing economic security experienced by twenty-first century working Ameri-
cans. For black Americans, it must be jarring when so many white
Americans of a certain age harken back to the 1950s as an idyllic time in
American history. And it is understandable that so many white Americans
do so, if they consider only their own perspective as white people. For many
white Americans, the post-War era is one of a confident America, proceed-
ing from its victory over evil forces to a prosperous time of greater inclu-
siveness. Past religious and ethnic distinctions among white Americans were
minimized by the common crucible of serving together in war.35 And even
on the labor front that is the focus of America as a Developing Country, one
can imagine that the joint effort of officers and enlisted men to win the War
had some bonding effect on business relations. A sense of unity and com-
mon purpose knit the nation together, and one might say that white identity
became more unified than ever before.36
Contributing to the ongoing unifying effect of the War on industrial
relations was also the sense that war had not ended; it was just that the
enemy and mode of engagement had changed. The post-War era of Ameri-
can economic dominance coincided with the Cold War, and a desire on the
part of policymakers and business interests to show that a market-based
economy was superior to communism in terms of what it could do for work-
ing people. And, of course, during this period, America actually fought two
costly hot wars in Korea and Vietnam. Thus, there were both patriotic and
pragmatic reasons for gainsharing between business and labor during this
period.
The inclusive experience of World War II for white Americans of di-
verse ethnic, religious, regional, and cultural backgrounds no doubt had
strong positive aspects. An immigrant nation with a history of tensions
among various European ethnic groups (e.g., think of terms like Paddy
Wagon) had just mobilized in an unprecedented, widespread way to defeat
not one, but two, fierce enemies. These diverse white Americans were
forged together by the cauldron of war, fighting side by side in units.
35 See generally DAVID J. TROWBRIDGE, America and World War II, 1941–1945, in A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES VOL. 22 (2012) (ebook), https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_a-
history-of-the-united-states-vol-2/s11-america-and-world-war-ii-1941-.html [https://perma.cc/
G2CD-MBU7] (explaining that the experience of fighting together with people of different
ethnic and religious backgrounds led many to broaden their horizons).
36 See John A. Powell & Caitlin Watt, Negotiating the New Political and Racial Environ-
ment, 11 J.L. SOC’Y 31, 38 (2010) (“The modern form of whiteness as a salient feature of
identity was not well established before World War II. Instead, most Euro-Americans contin-
ued to identify along ethnic lines. The creation and expansion of modern suburbs [after World
War II] changed that. Euro-Americans traded in their ethnic identity in exchange for a more
generic white identity. And while there was a softening of identity between ethnic European
Americans, there was a hardening of lines between the newly emerging white and blacks.”);
see generally RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE
AMERICA (1990).
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Fighting a war together reminds folks of their larger shared interest—in
a polity that works for everyone. World War II knitted together our nation.
No one was exempt from its effects, even on the home front, building a
perfect foundation for the commitment to the peaceful resolutions of dis-
putes that emerged out of the New Deal. This is especially true if the troops
go home to increasing prosperity and there are ways for the managers (i.e.,
the officers) and the workers (i.e., enlisted soldiers) to both gain from this
growing prosperity.
This helped create a strong American identity, but also likely created a
strong “white” American identity. That is, white Americans were less sepa-
rated along dimensions like Catholic versus Protestant, or Irish versus Italian
versus Polish, and more likely to see themselves as just Americans.
Notably absent from this common identity were black people, who
were shunted into separate units. Black Americans’ different status was ulti-
mately reinforced, not diminished, by the War effort. Although black ser-
vicemen were crucial to victory, they were not integrated into units with
whites. Their different and subordinate status was instead reinforced.37
“White identity” was perhaps therefore strengthened by the World War II
experience, and ultimately political leaders seeking votes exploited that
sense of common identity by dividing working-class voting power along ra-
cial lines.
And when the nation wisely undertook to give returning servicemen
educational and housing benefits,38 these had far less effect for black people.
The housing benefits they got did not enable them to buy in attractive neigh-
borhoods; they were segregated out.39 The education benefits they got did
not enable them to get into segregated colleges. And there was no protection
for them against discrimination in the job market.
When the post-War engine of economic prosperity revved up, it there-
fore had a profoundly disparate effect on white people and black people.
Many whites were swept upward into the middle class and beyond, and
union members in particular enjoyed rising wages and living standards.
37 The U.S. Armed Forces were finally integrated by Executive Order 9981, signed by
President Harry Truman on July 26, 1948. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26,
1948).
38 See Suzanne Mettler, How the G.I. Bill Built the Middle Class and Enhanced Democ-
racy, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK, (Jan. 2012), https://scholars.org/contribution/how-gi-
bill-built-middle-class-and-enhanced-democracy [https://perma.cc/78JD-4DT4] (“Four out of
five men born in the United States during the 1920s served in the military, and about half of
them used the G.I. Bill for education and training (either right after World War II or after the
Korean War, when comparably generous benefits were provided). Prior to 1940, colleges were
mostly for the privileged, but the G.I. Bill opened doors to many who were Catholic and
Jewish, including rural people, first-generation immigrant offspring, and veterans from work-
ing and middle class backgrounds.”).
39 See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\HLL106.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-FEB-20 9:31
2020] Development on a Cracked Foundation 81
Black Americans were largely bystanders to this special era of economic
inclusion, a period when the economy worked better for the many than ever
before, a period of declining inequality.40
This aspect of incomplete reform still has important consequences and
has its roots in FDR’s Faustian acceptance of the political pact that resolved
the Civil War, one in which Jim Crow was substituted for slavery and the
South’s right to subjugate black people was accepted by other American re-
gions that themselves had treated black people unfairly. In governing the
nation and forging the New Deal, Roosevelt had to address the reality of the
South’s political power, particularly its power in the Senate due to the persis-
tence of the bargain made at the beginning of our republic, as well as the
pervasiveness of electoral practices in border states that gave disproportion-
ate influence to rural areas where pro-Jim Crow sentiment was stronger.41
The New Deal’s acceptance of Jim Crow shows that there were impor-
tant ways in which the law and development story the Authors outline for the
United States has its own uniquely negative aspects, just as Argentina’s did.
Reforms accepting the disenfranchisement of black people, the rigged power
system inflating the influence of Southern whites, Southern states, and white
moneyed elites in general were bound to be incomplete and to lack a firm
foundation resistant to pushback down the line.42
Given the South’s political power, the New Deal’s positive impact on
the lives of black people was far less than it should have been, and the
Roosevelt administration took at best tiny steps toward racial fairness. Be-
cause of the absence of racial progress, a deep cleave existed between the
white members of the working class and black people. This cleave divided
the union movement itself in important ways.43
40 According to a Yale Law Journal note published about a decade after the NLRA was
enacted, “[d]iscrimination by labor unions against racial minorities, particularly Negroes,
[was] still frequent.” Note, Discrimination by Labor Union Bargaining Representatives
Against Racial Minorities, 56 YALE L.J. 731, 731 (1947). Indeed, although poverty rates de-
clined for both white and black Americans during this period, black poverty continued to be
much higher than white poverty. In 1959, the black poverty rate stood at 55.1%. By 1973, the
black poverty rate had fallen to 30.3%. By contrast, the white poverty rate was only 18.1% in
1959, declining to 8.6% in 1974. Today, black poverty remains persistently higher than white
poverty. In 2017, the black poverty rate stood at 21.2%, whereas the white poverty rate stood
at 10.7%. See Historical Poverty Tables: People and Families – 1959 to 2017, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, tbl. 2, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/histori-
cal-poverty-people.html [https://perma.cc/PSF2-7W2V].
41 See, e.g., Louis Menand, How the Deal Went Down, NEW YORKER (Feb. 24, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-down [https://
perma.cc/GAD9-QP2Y] (noting members of the Southern bloc were “the most important
‘veto players’ in American politics” during the Roosevelt presidency and that they “main-
tained . . . a ‘Southern cage’ around New Deal legislation”).
42 See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME
151–60 (2013).
43 See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, Movements in Crisis: Employee-Owned Businesses—A Strat-
egy for Coalition Between Unions and Civil Rights Organizations, 46 HOW. L.J. 49, 65 (2002)
(“During the late nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries there was a fair amount
of distance, and even antagonism, between blacks and the labor movement. Unions openly
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The South was a huge beneficiary of the New Deal and received and
continues to receive huge subsidies from other regions of the nation.44 But
the South never accepted the right of workers to fairly join a union in the
same way it embraced other aspects of the New Deal, like agricultural subsi-
dies, infrastructure investments, and Social Security benefits.
Union concentration in the South lagged other regions, and the votes to
undercut the NLRA through the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act45 and the
override of President Truman’s veto were strongly supported by Southern
Democratic members of Congress.46 Before Taft-Hartley, several Southern
states had passed so-called “right to work” statutes,47 and its enactment fa-
cilitated a wave of additional states’ adoption.48 These were especially popu-
excluded blacks from membership. Indeed, this history of exclusion prompted the NAACP to
oppose passage of the NLRA because it created, in effect, a monopoly power in unions over
worker representation, but had no provision requiring that union membership be open to all
regardless of race.”).
44 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Federal Government Uses North’s and Midwest’s Dollars to Aid
the South, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/08/us/
federal-government-uses-north-s-midwest-s-dollars-aid-south-study-says.html [https://
perma.cc/5DD3-K4MV]; Morgan Scarboro, Which States Rely the Most on Federal Aid?, TAX
FOUND. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/states-rely-most-federal-aid/ [https://
perma.cc/VCT6-YS9R]; John Tierney, Which States Are Givers and Which Are Takers?, AT-
LANTIC (May 5, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/which-states-
are-givers-and-which-are-takers/361668/ [https://perma.cc/HLA9-MQN6] (showing that
Southern states receive more in federal aid than they remit to the federal government in taxes
while Northern states receive less in federal aid than they remit to the federal government in
taxes). The failure of the New Deal to address and overcome the outlying anti-worker senti-
ment also has lessons for today. Although the New Deal should have gone further in my view,
it did accept the central idea that the United States had to include all of its regions, including
its poorest one, the South, in prosperity. The future of the European Union in large measure
depends on the willingness of the people who reside in the leading European economies like
Germany, France, and the Netherlands to accept that a common Europe must draw into the
fold nations like Spain, Portugal, and Greece, plus the former Soviet bloc nations of Eastern
Europe, while keeping in mind the U.S. lesson, which is that these nations should not be
allowed to undercut the legitimate rights and economic leverage of other E.U. workers.
45 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
46 20 Democratic Senators—mostly from the South—joined their Republican colleagues
to override President Truman’s veto. See H.R. 3020. Passage Over the President’s Veto, GOV-
TRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/80-1947/s86 [https://perma.cc/FF8T-DAYR]
(last visited Sep. 29, 2019).
47 See Right to Work States Timeline, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, https://
nrtwc.org/facts/state-right-to-work-timeline-2016/ [https://perma.cc/C2LP-QQY9] (last vis-
ited Sep. 29, 2019). Consistent with the notion that our society is one grounded in certain
ideals, the principal state laws that act to impede the expansion and effectiveness of unions are
styled “right to work” laws. This so-called right is to work free from having to join a union
and, perhaps more accurately, free to be discharged at will by your employer and free to have
no voice in the terms and conditions of your employment.
48 See Richard D. Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, “Architects of Democracy”: Labor
Organizing as a Civil Right, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 234 (2013) (“Southern segregation-
ists followed up their support for the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 with an array of state-
based ‘right to work’ laws, which weaken unions by allowing employees to be ‘free riders’—
benefiting from union collective bargaining but not contributing dues. To this day, the states
most resistant to unions are those in the former Confederacy and Jim Crow South.”).
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lar in the South, where a uniform wall of anti-labor state laws existed as
early as 1947.49
These rifts in the New Deal coalition presaged in important ways the
erosion of the labor movement’s leverage in our economy. How?
Let’s start with the ugliest reality: race. Starting almost as soon as the
civil and voting rights legislation was passed in 1964 and 1965 and the John-
son administration began to advocate for affirmative action, politicians be-
gan to exploit race to divide white working class voters from black people,
and to encourage them to cast votes that could be seen as objectively con-
trary to their economic interests. The Nixon and Wallace campaigns of 1968
began what continued and continues to be a trope.
The earlier failure to fully include black people in the benefits of the
New Deal—post-War benefits for GIs, and perhaps most of all inclusion in
the post-War economic boom—meant that when black people got full labor
rights, there was in fact a great deal of catching up to do. As America’s
period of unrivaled economic dominance ended and periods of increasing
unemployment became more common, efforts to overcome racial inequality
through affirmative action became controversial. Moneyed white elites were
not much affected by these efforts, but these policies affected many impor-
tant decisions for middle class workers, including the promotion of teachers,
police officers, and lower level white-collar workers.50 And when economic
tides were no longer constantly rising, zero-sum stories involving white
working people unfairly bearing the brunt of affirmative action gained ap-
peal among white workers, including many who were union members.
Nixon’s two successful campaigns and the later victories of Ronald Reagan
all depended in no small measure on racially divisive appeals to the white
working class.
Elections like those in 1968 and 1980 have consequences, particularly
for the effectiveness of legislative schemes like the NLRA, where the fidel-
ity of the administrative agency that administers the statute is critical to the
49 See Right to Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx [https://
perma.cc/8PAJ-RUTK] (last visited Sep. 22, 2019). The deep-rooted nature of racism was
reflected in unions themselves and provided both a legitimate reason to limit union power, at
least in the sense of requiring unions not to discriminate on invidious bases, but also a high-
minded reason for those who were not genuinely committed to equal rights for black people to
restrict union rights when their real motives were different. As a distinguished scholar has
noted, the duty that unions owe of fair representation to all workers in a workforce it repre-
sents arose in part out of a case where a union had systematically discriminated against black
workers. See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169,
179–85 (2015) (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944)). Busi-
ness interests argued that this type of discrimination provided a reason to restrict the ability to
have workforces where everyone was required to join the union, so-called closed shops. She
notes, however, that the reality that the movement for right-to-work statutes was dominated by
forces hostile to civil rights makes it strained to suggest that Taft-Hartley and state right-to-
work laws were inspired by a genuine regard for black people, as opposed to a desire to reduce
the power of working people. See id.
50 Ditto for issues like using busing to remediate school segregation.
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statute’s success. The basic right of the NLRA—“the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection”51—is one that has to be made real in actual cases. I graduated
from law school at a time when labor law was still an important upper-level
law school course. Even as of the 1980s, labor law cases evidenced a strong
anti-union bias on the part of Nixon-administration appointees,52 a trend that
sharply accelerated under Presidents Reagan53 and Bush.54 To many com-
mentators, the NLRB became an institution more often associated with de-
laying, thwarting, or making less effective the ability of workers to use
unions to obtain better wages and working conditions.55 More recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions have further reduced unions’ collective bargaining
power by depriving them of their ability to get fair recompense from nonun-
ion members that the unions are legally required to represent in bargaining
negotiations and discipline and discharge cases.56
A key part of the Authors’ story involves the acceptance by the federal
judiciary of the administrative state,57 and in particular the judiciary’s valida-
tion of statutes that had broad directional mandates but left important details
of implementation to agencies of the Executive Branch. This acceptance en-
abled agencies to give life to congressional mandates over time, in a manner
that took into account evolving developments, past mistakes, and new pro-
posals for innovation. Ensuring that this was done in a rational way that
considered the perspectives of key constituencies, evolving standards of ad-
ministrative law provided for notice and an opportunity to be heard.58 But
agencies were left with a broad range of discretionary authority, subject only
to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a standard that can be
analogized to a public-law version of the business-judgment rule for some-
one like me steeped in corporate law. Not only that: the Authors stress that in
giving life to the words of a statute through interpretation, the FDR-era
courts came to be much more deferential to the agency’s subject matter ex-
51 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
52 See Stephen C. Vladeck, The Nixon Board and Retail Bargaining Units, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 416, 416 (1976) (“[T]he [National Labor Relations] Board clearly expressed the essen-
tially anti-labor bias that permeated substantial parts of the Nixon administration.”).
53 See Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16
RUTGERS L.J. 269, 269–70 (1985).
54 See William B. Gould IV, The Labor Board’s Ever Deepening Somnolence: Some Re-
flections of a Former Chairman, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1505, 1510–11, 1516–17 (1999).
55 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 53, at 269–70 (“[T]he three years since President Reagan’s
appointees began to join the Board, there has been an unprecedented assault on this country’s
labor laws. This attack was not led by legislators who are authorized to amend or repeal the
Act, but by Board members who are wholly unsympathetic to the Act’s purposes.”).
56 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014); see also Estlund, supra note 49, at 185–89
(commenting on Harris).
57 America as a Developing Country, supra note 2, at 49–51.
58 See id.
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pertise, trusting in its basic commitment to honoring the fundamental pur-
pose of the statute it was administering.59
In other words, the elasticity of the NLRA and other New Deal legisla-
tive frameworks brought out the elasticity in legal thinkers, including judges,
on the political right. A conscious political strategy emerged on the right to
undercut the New Deal and restore laissez-faire capitalism, often through
judicial action.60 The reality is that executive fidelity to the animating pur-
pose of a statute—the NRLA’s emphasis on working people’s right to organ-
ize or the Clean Air Act’s emphasis on breathable air—is vital to ensuring
that the statutory purpose was in fact served. And emerging conservative
legal thinkers in the Nixon and Reagan eras recognized this fact. The so-
called Chevron doctrine, it bears noting, was largely forged in an era where
right-wing administrations were enacting regulations that could be seen as
more thwarting, than facilitating, of the statutory regimes they were suppos-
edly advancing. After all, Chevron was a case involving an environmental
group’s argument that the EPA was adopting regulations to impede the cen-
tral purpose of the Clean Air Act by cutting back on pollution restrictions.61
That Chevron was a doctrine strongly supported by prior conservative jus-
tices62 has not balked a new generation of activist conservative justices from
seeking to undermine it, perhaps because they were deciding cases involving
regulations issued by a Democratic administration and that less deference
could allow them to restrict the effectiveness of the regulatory state.63
59 See id.
60 The “Powell Memorandum,” authored by then-soon-to-be Justice Lewis Powell two
months before he was nominated to serve on the Supreme Court, argued for just this strategy.
See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Education
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 32–34 (Aug. 23, 1971), https://scholarlycom-
mons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=powellmemo [https://
perma.cc/U86F-SHJT]. Sent to a senior Chamber of Commerce executive and entitled “Attack
on American Free Enterprise System,” the memorandum called for the business community to
defend the free enterprise system from attack by the left. See id. Powell’s focus in the memo-
randum was not the far left, but rather figures who would be considered center-left in most
European social democracies. See id. at 32 (lamenting the shift to “some aspects” of social-
ism). The memorandum laid out a multi-pronged strategy for the business community that
included changes to public opinion through education, the cultivation of political power, and
acting through the courts—the latter of which Powell described as “a vast area of opportunity
for the Chamber.” Id. at 25–27. Although the memorandum did not identify labor as a specific
area for reform, it did contrast the political power held by organized labor with that held by
businesses. See id. at 30.
61 See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
62 For example, Justice Scalia wrote a strong article praising Chevron. See Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 3 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
63 Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, with Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142,
1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Under any conception of our separation of
powers, I would have thought powerful and centralized authorities like today’s administrative
agencies would have warranted less deference from other branches, not more. None of this is
to suggest that Chevron is ‘the very definition of tyranny.’ But on any account it certainly
seems to have added prodigious new powers to an already titanic administrative state.”), and
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2151 (2016)
(supporting the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to “rein[ ] in” the Chevron doctrine); see also
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The incomplete acceptance of unions by the South and the body blow
dealt to the NLRA by Taft-Hartley64 operated to harm the leverage of Ameri-
can workers more generally when global competition from Japan, Germany,
Korea, and other nations began to intensify in the 1970s. Americans born in
this century may not remember that before there was the specter of competi-
tion from low wage industries in China, Vietnam, and India, there was arbi-
trage against American workers by states like South Carolina and
Mississippi, arguing that more production should be shifted to states where it
was quite difficult to form a union and where lower wages prevailed.65 In
other words, when global competition hit, American workers faced a busi-
ness response that involved substituting lower-wage workers for more gener-
ously paid ones. Thus, on both the domestic and international front,
businesses sought to preserve and increase profits to stockholders by dimin-
ishing the share of production costs and the share of corporate success attrib-
utable to the price of paying workers.
And this international arbitrage involving labor was itself a product of
the incompletely realized nature of the New Deal order. FDR’s vision for the
post-War era was of the world that would embrace all elements of the New
Deal. There would be liberalized trade among nations, but so too would
there be protection for the legitimate rights of working people in the nations
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same); Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(same); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) (questioning Chev-
ron’s constitutionality); cf. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (same). As Professor
Metzger details, the attack on Chevron forms part of a broader attack on the administrative
state, often from an “originalist” perspective designed to restore what some view as a “Consti-
tution in Exile,” since the New Deal. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (2017); see also Sophia Z. Lee,
Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the
Present, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (noting that critics of the administrative state,
“labeled defenders of the ‘Constitution in Exile,’ call[ ] for a return to what they describe[ ]
as the pre-New Deal constitutional order”). The originalist attack on the administrative state is
in tension with the findings of distinguished scholars that substantial congressional delegations
of authority to the Executive Branch were common in the nineteenth century and that judicial
review was less stringent and consistent than in the twentieth century. See generally JERRY L.
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS
OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); see also Lee, supra; Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal
Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362 (2010).
64 See Estlund, supra note 49, at 180–81 (arguing that Taft-Hartley had a negative effect
on worker power by authorizing right-to-work laws that restricted union authority and reach
and limiting the use of picketing and boycotts).
65 See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, How the American South Drives the Low-Wage Economy,
AM. PROSPECT (July 6, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/how-american-south-drives-low-
wage-economy [http://perma.cc/F2GF-T5TM] (“But the shift of higher-value manufacturing
to the South since the 1960s, once the South was air-conditioned and its Jim Crow laws nulli-
fied, has had a more profound effect on the American economy. Workers at the unionized auto,
steel, aerospace, and other durable-goods factories in the Northern and Western states during
the three decades following World War II attained a standard of living and of employment
stability all but unknown to earlier generations of workers. Since the 1970s, however, that
standard—and with it, the American middle class—has been eroded by the emergence of
lower-wage competition from both the Global South and the domestic South.”).
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in the trading regime.66 But the same forces that brought about Taft-Hartley
also undermined the completion of Roosevelt’s vision for the post-War inter-
national economic order among the market-based economies. Freer trade
was encouraged by a strong international regime, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the organization that ultimately became the World Trade
Organization. But efforts to secure a comparably strong international legal
regime protecting the fair expectations of working people did not succeed.
Proposals to put real teeth into international law to guarantee working people
the legal right to join unions, bargain for fair wages, and freedom from un-
safe working conditions foundered.67 In comparison to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization, the
International Labor Organization was never given the necessary tools to pro-
tect the fair leverage of workers in the post-War trading regime.68 That was
in no small measure because the United States itself did not support a
stronger international system of labor protection. Put simply, the era during
which Taft-Hartley passed was also one where anti-labor sentiment, aided in
large measure by the Southern elements of the Democratic Party itself, un-
dercut the leverage of labor within the emerging international trading
order.69
During the period of Western hegemony from 1945 to the early 1970s,
this did not seem so costly. Never was growing prosperity so widely
shared.70
66 See David B. Woolner, FDR’s Comprehensive Approach to Freer Trade, THE
ROOSEVELT INST. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/fdrs-comprehensive-approach-
freer-trade/ [http://perma.cc/8MMK-KQAB] (observing that Roosevelt’s efforts to liberalize
world trade were “accompanied by such critical pieces of legislation as the National Labor
Relations Act and Fair Labor Standards Act, which vastly strengthened the place of unions in
American life” and as such were aimed to provide “economic security” for all Americans);
Kuttner, supra note 31 (noting that protections for labor rights were included in the original
International Trade Organization called for after the Bretton Woods conference and were in
key parts of the U.N. Charter, all inspired by FDR).
67 See Strine, supra note 31, at 282–83 (collecting authorities on this point).
68 See Keith E. Maskus, Should Core Labor Standards Be Imposed Through International
Trade Policy?, World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1817, 55–57 (1997), http:/
/ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/labor/maskus.pdf [http://perma.cc/TL36-J74F] (discussing the
ILO’s lack of “binding powers of enforcement”).
69 See, e.g., Sanjukta Paul, The Double Standard of Antitrust Law, AM. PROSPECT (June
24, 2019), http://prospect.org/article/double-standard-antitrust-law [http://perma.cc/DGC3-
6J43] (noting that Taft-Hartley prevents workers not in the same bargaining unit within a
single employer from engaging in collective action to improve their joint well-being, but that
conservative antitrust policy focused solely on consumer welfare allows huge corporations to
use equivalent economic leverage for their own advantage). See also Ira Katznelson et al., The
Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 283, 285–86 (1993).
70 Anne Applebaum, The Lure of Western Europe, 66 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (2019) (book
review) (“In the early years, this gigantic and unprecedented experiment in democracy and
integration brought immediate benefits for all of the members of the West. What the French
called les trentes glorieuses—the thirty years of steady growth and expansion of social bene-
fits from the 1940s to the 1970s—had its echo elsewhere in the bloc. Germany had its Wirt-
schaftswunder, led by Adenauer’s finance minister, Ludwig Erhard; Italy had its boom
economico, an extraordinary transformation that saw incomes double and triple within a gener-
ation. Even in the dictatorships of the Iberian Peninsula, which did not join European institu-
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But when that hegemony gave way and vigorous competition came
from competing nations, with workforces with lower pay and few rights, the
ability of businesses to compete by cutting worker pay and cutting jobs
grew. And no effective cross-border regime existed that prevented that. In
fact, if anything, the most powerful international bodies made it difficult to
restrict imports from nations where workers did not have collective bargain-
ing rights, safe working conditions, or decent pay.71
At the same time, government policies began to increase the power of
stockholders over companies, by creating incentives that put more and more
capital in the hands of professional money managers, often capital ultimately
from the paychecks of working people.72
We now look back on the NLRA’s halcyon period as if we were looking
at an alien world. Private sector unionization has fallen from over 25% to
just 11%.73 The real median household income since 1984 has grown by only
tions until the 1970s, postwar growth was remarkable: in Spain, GDP per capita rose by a
factor of ten between 1960 and 1975. Growth and industrialization were accompanied by a
parallel growth in social benefits: universal health care, free education, and government safety
nets became the norm everywhere in Western Europe.”).
71 This had obvious consequences for gainsharing between labor and capital. See, e.g.,
Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1120, 1131–32 (2018) (“The era of declining economic inequality . . . was rather remarkable.
The share of total income accruing to the top 1% declined from about 24% in the mid-1920s to
a low of about 9% in the early 1970s. But since the early 1970s, economic inequality has risen
steadily. In the mid-2000s, the percentage of total income that the top 1% accrued nearly
equaled that which this group accrued at the high point of inequality in the 1920s. Since the
Great Recession of 2008 produced a temporary pause in the top 1%’s rising concentration of
wealth, this group’s share of income has resumed its rise, reaching 22% in 2012.”).
72 See Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1879
(2018) (“First, the transformation of the American firm to prioritize maximizing shareholder
returns has deeply altered the firm’s relationship with its employees, incentivizing the system-
atic deployment of labor-cost minimization to satisfy profitability constraints while making
flexible temporary work arrangements more attractive. This shift in human resource manage-
ment has corresponded with a continuous rise in labor productivity, wage stagnation, and in-
creased returns to shareholders. While worker productivity is estimated to have grown 64.9%
between 1979 and 2013, hourly compensation has only increased by 8.2%.”).
73 See MEGAN DUNN & JAMES WALKER, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBER-
SHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-
in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf [perma.cc/3N7Q-9FYG];
Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 581, 604–05 (2007). EU labor union membership rates, by contrast, tend to be
much higher, with France being a notable exception. See Jelle Visser, Union Membership Sta-
tistics in 24 Countries, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 45 (2006), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cacb/
8b99492b7cf17f035cb673c2156bd920a198.pdf [perma.cc/BMY6-UAG4] (reporting a 12.6%
union density rate in the United States as of 2002, compared with a 26.3% rate across the
European Union). As in the United States, however, EU union membership has also been
declining. See id. (reporting an 11.1% decline from 1970 to 2003 in the United States and an
11.5% decline in the European Union); see also OECD, Key Issues for Labour Market and
Social Policy 101, https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/4358365.pdf [perma.cc/226F-2KKL]. But in
the EU, requirements for workers’ councils exist and apply even at companies without unions.
See Council Directive 2009/38/EC, 2006, O.J. (L 122) 28–44, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0038 [perma.cc/7D3E-VDSL] (requiring EU member
states to provide the right for workers in companies that employ at least 1,000 workers to form
workers’ councils).
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22% or 0.6% per year,74 while the income of the top 1% of Americans has
grown by over 180% or 3.4% per year.75 Inequality in the United States has
soared to levels last seen during the Gilded Age of the 1920s.76 A president
who spoke to the resulting economic insecurities of working people rose to
office largely by blaming these developments on the “other,” in the form of
immigrant workers within the United States and unfair competition from
foreign nations. Some truth was in those arguments, but they obscured the
larger reason for the diminution in economic security for the many, which
was that the sound protections of the New Deal and European social democ-
racy for working people that promoted fair gainsharing had been eroded
throughout the OECD, most especially in the United States. That erosion
was more profound in the United States because of the policy choices that
emerged as a result of the incomplete realization of the New Deal vision at
its inceptive period.77
74 See Real Median Household Income in the United States, ST. LOUIS FED. RES., https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N [perma.cc/2BS6-U74F] (last visited Oct. 1,
2019); see also Tyler Cowen, Is Innovation Over? The Case Against Pessimism, 95 FOREIGN
AFF. 42, 42 (2016) (“Real wages are stagnant. The real median wage earned by men in the
United States is lower today than it was in 1969. Median household income, adjusted for
inflation, is lower now than it was in 1999 and has barely risen in the past several years despite
the formal end of the recession in 2009.”).
75 See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, NBER Working Paper tbl. 2 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20625.pdf [https://perma.cc/E77Y-B54U]. Wage stagnation
and increasing inequality began to emerge in the 1970s. See Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts,
ECON. POL. INST., https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/ [perma.cc/
KK6T-69SE]. The average hourly wage in the United States is $22.65—almost a dollar below
the average hourly wage, in terms of purchasing power, in 1973. Drew Desilver, For Most U.S.
Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-
budged-for-decades/ [perma.cc/V9JL-DMWX] (“After adjusting for inflation, however, to-
day’s average hourly wage has just about the same purchasing power it did in 1978, following
a long slide in the 1980s and early 1990s and bumpy, inconsistent growth since then. In fact, in
real terms average hourly earnings peaked more than 45 years ago: The $4.03-an-hour rate
recorded in January 1973 had the same purchasing power that $23.68 would today.”).
76 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 75, at 3.
77 The comparatively sharper growth in inequality and drop in gainsharing with labor in
the U.S. compared to its OECD allies has in part to do with the stronger rights given to labor in
those nations, which have not only more potent labor laws but also laws requiring mandatory
works councils at large companies, even when those companies do not have unions. See Ine-
quality in Labour Income—What Are its Drivers and How Can it Be Reduced?, OECD ECON.
DEP’T POL’Y NOTES NO. 8 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/eco/public-finance/49417273.pdf
[perma.cc/B76M-LAA2] (showing that “[h]igher union membership tends to be associated
with lower income inequality”). Put simply, the U.S. gives more power to capital than any
other country in the OECD, and less leverage to workers. Given that, the outcomes that have
resulted seem logical and what is surprising is that anyone is surprised by them. Although
inequality has been rising globally, the United States remains the most unequal country across
its peer set. Indeed, among OECD countries, only South Africa, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile,
and Turkey have greater income inequality than the U.S. See Income Inequality, OECD, https:/
/data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm [perma.cc/4FX7-FU42]. And from 1985 to
2008, U.S. inequality has grown at a rate that is exceeded by few OECD countries. See An
Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in the OECD: Main Findings, OECD, 2122, 2124
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The bright spot from these realities is that the decline in economic se-
curity has been so pronounced that a renewed interest has been taken in the
idea that workers will not be treated fairly unless they are heard and unless
businesses are required to respect them. Rather than ugly, wrong-headed an-
swers based on blaming the others—answers that have taken the form of
Brexit in the U.K., the election of anti-immigrant parties in Italy, and the
elevation of an anti-Semitic party in Hungary—what is needed is a global
New Deal that embeds principles of economic fairness and guarantees eco-
nomic security for the many into the globalized economic system. Put sim-
ply, the process of law and development that the Authors rightly argue is so
important must logically extend to developing international institutions of
legal regulation effective enough to protect the workers of a global econ-
omy. That is not a naı̈ve statement; what is naı̈ve is to think that separate
systems of separate national regulation can provide working people who
must compete in international trading markets with the economic security
they deserve.
(2011), https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf [perma.cc/226F-2KKL] (noting that from
1985 to 2008, the U.S. was one of a few countries that saw inequality climb by more than 4%).
